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NOTE
RULES OF INDEPENDENT INSURANCE AGENTS'
ASSOCIATIONS UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
The bulk of the fire, casualty and marine insurance sold in this
country is written through independent insurance agents. While an
agent in the sense that his actions are binding upon his companies, each
such agent is, in addition, an independent contractor, for he is free to
place the business of his customers with any of the companies which he
represents. Since the customer deals with the agent rather than with the
company, the agent is encouraged to protect the interests of the customer
by securing adequate coverage and, where possible, rate adjustments and
by representing the customer in case of conflict between insured and
company.' At the same time, since the agent's independence stimulates
competition among the companies for a greater share of his business,2
the companies will often accede to his demands in order to retain that
business.
In many localities independent insurance agents have formed associa-
tions which seek to preserve their members' freedom from insurance
company domination, sponsor legislation dealing with the insurance busi-
ness, make recommendations to insurance companies with regard to pro-
posed changes in policy coverage, and guard against violations of the in-
surance laws. These associations also may offer programs of insurance
education both for their members and outsiders, sponsor programs of fire
prevention and conduct group advertising campaigns.3 Some associations
are confined to agents writing one or a few lines of insurance; 4 others
include agents of all types of property underwriters. Undoubtedly to
some extent they attempt to maintain or improve the competitive position
of their members.
Like other trade associations, these organizations of insurance agents
have enacted rules pertaining to their standards of membership and to the
conduct of their members. A number of these rules have an impact upon
1. United States v. Insurance Bd. of Cleveland, 144 F. Supp 684, 688 (N.D. Ohio
1956) ; see Kerr & Elliott v. Green Mountain Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 111 Vt. 502, 18 A.2d
164 (1941). See also National Underwriter, May 19, 1955, p. 11.
2. See United States v. Insurance Bd. of Cleveland, supra note 1, at 688; In re
Chapman, 50 F.2d 252, 253 (W.D. Ky. 1931).
3. See United States v. Insurance Bd. of Cleveland, 144 F. Supp. 684, 688 (N.D.
Ohio 1956); Brief for Defendant, pp. 7, 11-13, United States v. Insurance Bd. of
Cleveland, .rpra; 70 HAv. L. RZv. 1113, 1115 (1957).
4. See United States v. Insurance Ed. of Cleveland, supra note 3, at 688-89.
5. See United States v. Newv Orleans Ins. Exchange, 148 F. Supp. 915, 916 (E.D.
La. 1957).
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non-member agents and upon insurance companies represented by either
members or non-members. In United States v. Insurance Board of
Cleveland6 and United States v. New Orleans Insurance Exchange,
7
complaints alleged that certain of the rules of two such agents' associa-
tions constituted unlawful restraints upon trade within the meaning of
the Sherman Act.8 The rules placed in issue in the Cleveland and New
Orleans cases may be briefly described as follows: 9
(1) The in-or-out rule: an agent is ineligible for membership if he
represents a company that has other agents in the locality who are not
members of the association. Because of this rule, insurance companies
must elect to be represented exclusively either by association agents or
by non-association agents. Moreover, if an agent is to represent a
"board" company, he must join the association.
(2) The direct writer rule: an agent is ineligible for membership if
he represents a company which also solicits insurance directly from the
public through its own employees; likewise, the solicitor-employees of the
direct writing company are ineligible.
(3) The imutual rule: an agent representing any mutual company, as
contrasted with a stock insurance company, is ineligible for membership.
(4) The non-deviation rule: an agent is ineligible for membership
if he represents any company which deviates from the rates set by the
rating bureau representing stock companies in the state in which the associa-
tion operates.
(5) The reciprocity rule: no member of the association may have deal-
ings with a non-member. In effect, this rule precludes members from
using the brokerage facilities of non-members and prevents a non-member
from "brokering out" business through association members.
(6) The service office rule: an agent is ineligible for membership
if he represents a company which operates a local branch office perform-
ing policy-writing and recording services for its local agents.
In the Cleveland case, in summary judgment proceedings, the direct
writer rule was held to be unreasonable; a sufficient question of reason-
ability was found to require a trial on the merits regarding the mutual
and service office rules; and the Government's attack on the in-or-out
rule, the reciprocity rule and the non-deviation rule was dismissed on a
finding that these rules had been abandoned by the association. The New
Orleans court held illegal the in-or-out rule, the mutual rule, and the
direct writer rule. The other three rules were not litigated in the latter
case.
6. 144 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ohio 1956); ef. 70 HARv. L. Rgv. 1113 (1957).
7. 148 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. La. 1957).
8. Sherman Anti-Trust Act §§ 1, 2, 26 STAT. 208 (1890), as amended, 15
U.S.C. H 1, 2 (Supp. III, 1956).
9. Except as noted, terminology used in the Cleveland case is employed.
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Each of these rules would appear to involve a concerted refusal to
deal, either with other agents or with certain companies or with both.
The purpose of this Note is to consider the utility of the doctrinal tools
available under the Sherman Act in resolving the conflicts created by the
above rules, and to examine the solutions reached in the Cleveland and
New Orleans cases.
BoycoTTs UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
Section one of the Sherman Act makes illegal "every contract, com-
bination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of commerce among the several
States.. I Since the Standard Oil" decision this provision has
been interpreted as prohibiting only those acts which "unduly" or "un-
reasonably" restrict competition- 2 In each case a detailed consideration
of the purpose, the operation and the economic effect of the challenged
practice is required.'3  Certain restraints of trade, however, are "con-
clusively presumed" to be unreasonable; where these practices are shown
to exist, they are deemed "illegal per se," without considering their rea-
sonableness or justification in the particular circumstances.'
4 Such prac-
tices include price fixing,' 5 agreements to divide the market 1
6 and accord-
ing to some authorities, agreements to restrict production and profit-
pooling arrangements.' 7
Many authorities include "boycotts" in the "illegal per se" category.'
Yet the cases cited to support this view are at best equivocal. In most of
10. Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1, 26 STAT. 208 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(Supp. I1, 1956). The complaints in both the Cleveland and New Orleans cases
charged section two violations as well. This latter section has been interpreted as sup-
plementing the first section of the act "to make sure that by no possible guise could
the public policy embodied [therein]. . .be frustrated or evaded." Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911). The opinions in both of the aforementioned
cases focused upon section one.
11. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
12. See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CommITTEE To STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWs 5 (1955) (hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL's REPORT); Oppen-
heim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy,
50 MlcH. L. Rv. 1139, 1153 (1952).
13. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 615 (1953);
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527 (1948) ; Maple Flooring Mfrs.
Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 579 (1925) ; Board of Trade v. United States,
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT 10-11; Hale, Agreements
Among Competitors: Incidental and Reasonable Restraints of Trade, 33 MINN. L.
Rv. 331, 386 (1949) ; Oppenheim, supra note 12, at 1151.
14. Oppenheim, supra note 12, at 1150; see United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) ; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
But see United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 688-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
15. E.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra note 14; United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., supra note 14.
16. E.g., United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 341 U.S. 593 (1951);
United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
17. See Oppenheim, supra note 12, at 1155.
18. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 624-25 (1953)
(dictum) ; United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948) (dictum) ;
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT 25, 132; 6 TOULMIN, A TPATISE ON THE ANTI-TRUST
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them the Court considered evidence and made findings that competition
was in fact substantially hindered by the defendants' boycotts; 19 these
cases would not necessarily support application of the per se doctrine
to boycotts not having such an effect. In the remaining cases defendants'
actions were directed toward price fixing.2° Other authorities contend
that at least some forms of boycott are not per se illegal,21 a view suggested
in older Supreme Court decisions.P At least two recent district court
decisions, including the Cleveland case, have rejected the proposition that
all boycotts are illegal per se.P
If boycotts be considered in light of the underlying rationale of the
per se doctrine, there should be little surprise at the diversity of opinion
on the doctrine's application in boycott situations. Practices held illegal
per se are essentially those whose purpose could only be to restrict
competition or those whose effect is so harmful to competition as to make
it extremely unlikely that any lawful reasons for engaging in the practice
could outweigh that harmful effect, particularly where adequate considera-
tion of the asserted justification would impose a significant burden on the
court or on the other party.2 4 Applying these standards to boycotts, it is
LAws OP TrHZ UNIT4D STATEs § 2.5 (1951) ; Adams, The "Rule of Reason": Workable
Competitiomi or Workable Motopolyl, 63 YAMZ LJ. 348, 349 (1954); Oppenheim,
supra note 12, at 1155.
19. Cases falling into this category which were cited by the authorities in note 18
supra are: Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) ; Fashion Originators'
Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Millinery Creator's Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 469
(1941) (case held to be indistinguishable from Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC,
supra, and decided on that ground); United States v. First Nat'l Pictures, Inc., 282
U.S. 44 (1930) ; Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930) ;
Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923) ; Eastern States Retail Lumber
Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914) ; Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193
U.S. 38 (1904). United States v. Insura;ce Board of Cleveland rejects these cases as
authority that all boycotts are illegal per se. 144 F. Supp. at 696-98.
20. Keifer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph Seagram & Sons, Inc 340 U.S. 211 (1951);
United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
21. Barber, Refusals To Deal, 3 PRAc. LAW. 21 (1957) ; Barber, Refusals To Deal
Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. Riv. 847, 872-79 (1955); Kirk-
patrick, Commercial Boycotts -as Per Se Violations of the Shernuz Act, 10 Gzo.
WAsH. L. Rxv, 302, 305-06, 388 (1941); see 70 HFAv. L. Rav. 1113, 1114 (1957).
Barber draws a distinction between boycotts the purpose of which is to restrain
competition and those carried out for some other purpose, calling only the former
illegal per se.
22. See Cement Manufacturers Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925);
Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 598 (1936) (dictum); United States
v. American Livestock Comn'n Co., 279 U.S. 435 (1929) (dictum); cf. American
Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 533 (1943) (dictum).
23. 144 F. Supp. at 696-98; District of Columbia Citizen Publishing Co. v.
Merchants & Manufacturers Ass'n, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 994 (D.D.C. 1949). The court in
the New Orleans case avoided this issue. See 148 F. Supp. at 918-19. There was dictum
in the court of appeals decision most cited by the per se advocates to the effect that
some boycotts might be legal under the Sherman Act. Fashion Originators' Guild
v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80, 85-86 (2d Cir. 1940). This was not discussed in the Sup-
reme Court opinion. 312 U.S. 457 (1941). Some boycotts were legal at common law.
See R-,STAT4MENT, ToRTs § 765 (1939).
24. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940);
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) ; ArTORxsY Gxr~aRAs
REPoRT 12-13 (Majority Opinion), 391-92 (dissenting opinion of Louis B. Schwartz) ;
Adams, supra note 18, at 353; Barber, Refusals To Deal Under the Federal Antitrust
Laws, 103 U. PA. L. Rtv. 847, 875-86 (1955).
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clear at the outset that all concerted refusals to deal are not necessarily
designed to coerce or exclude outsiders from competition; 25 many are
normal agreements in aid of lawful business activities such as trade associa-
tion rules limiting association services to members 2 6 Hence, to the extent
that the courts attempt to determine the purpose of each challenged
boycott, the fact that the evidence relevant to purpose or intent is likely
to resemble closely that which would be relevant to the question of reason-
ableness makes it difficult to ascertain whether a per se rule or the rule
of reason is being applied ?7  It seems clear, however, that at least some
concerted refusals to deal may necessarily be intended to or have the effect
of so restricting competition as to preclude the likelihood of counter-
balancing justification, as where a dominant group of motion picture dis-
tributors agrees to supply films only to those exhibitors who deal with all
members of the group.28 At the same time, unlike the case of price fixing,
for example, where the agreed price will vary with changing economic
conditions and where the factors determining the reasonableness of that
price are extremely numerous and complex,29 no great burden need ordi-
narily be entailed in considering evidence on the alleged justification for
a boycott. Fluctuating economic conditions do not so affect boycotts as
to require continual reappraisal of evidence as to their reasonableness, nor
need consideration of the reasonableness of a boycott open a question of
such unlimited evidentiary magnitude as does the reasonableness of an
agreed price. Thus, the boycott cases, if any, to which a per se rule
seems applicable are those where the object of the practice is in fact to
restrict competition or where the effect is to do so to such a degree that
justification becomes immaterial.
Accordingly, in examining the propriety of the six rules litigated in
the Cleveland and New Orleans cases, an investigation into the purpose
and effect of each rule is required.30 Certain of these rules may in fact
25. Barber, supra note 24, at 872-79 (1955).
26. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 (1926); Maple Flooring
Mfg. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
27. See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). The Court
in that case refused to hear evidence of the reasonableness of the defendant's practices,
stating that "the reasonableness of the methods pursued by the combination is [not]
. . .material. . . ." Id. at 468. On the other hand, the Court made extensive findings
as to the effects of defendant's practices upon competition, many of which went beyond
the scope of the term "boycott." Id. at 465-66. These findings may have led the Court to
believe that the practices of the defendants were so unreasonable as to be incapable of
justification under the "rule of reason."
28. See Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923).
29. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940);
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
30. Although the McCarran Act subjects the business of insurance to the Sherman
Act only "to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law," it specifically
makes the Sherman Act applicable to acts or agreements of boycott, coercion, or in-
timidation in the insurance field. 59 STAr. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§
1011-15 (1952). It has been well established that federal legislation is applicable to local
activities exerting a "substantial economic effect" upon interstate commerce.
Acts affecting the market of a product which originated in such commerce have been
held to exert such an effect. Recognizing that in both cases more than 90% of the
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have the effect of coercing others in the trade into a course of action de-
sirable to the associaton or of hampering their ability to compete with
association members. Other rules, however, may merely establish standards
of membership necessary or appropriate in implementing the lawful
activities of the association, the effect upon trade being incidental and
minimal. Each rule must be evaluated both in terms of a possible per se
violation and, in the event its effect on competition might not be considered
so harmful as to make further inquiry unnecessary, in terms of the factors
which might justify the restraint as reasonable. As noted above, so far
as the purpose of each rule is relevant both to its possible illegality per se
and to its reasonableness, these inquiries must necessarily overlap.31
THE IN-OR-OUT RULE
3 2
The in-or-out rule declares an agent ineligible for membership in
the association if he represents an insurance company having other agents
in the locality who are not members. Because of the rule, an insurance
company wishing to sell through member agents cannot seek representation
by non-members, and, conversely, those companies represented by non-
members cannot gain representation by member agents.
The rule's effect on the non-member agent is to deny him access to
any "board company." Since the association members in many localities
companies represented by associated members were located in other states, both the
New Orleans and Cleveland courts held that the federal government had jurisdiction
over the activities of the respective associations. 148 F. Supp. at 921-22 & n.20; 144
F. Supp. at 689; United States v. New Orleans Ins. Exchange, 1955 Trade Cas. 1
67,936 (E.D. La. 1954) ; see Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar
Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v.
Chrysler Corp. Parts Wholesalers, 180 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1950); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941);
Stern, The Scope of the Phrase Interstate Commerce, 41 A.B.A.J. 823 (1955). But see
United States v. Starlite Drive-In, Inc., 204 F2d 419 (7th Cir. 1953).
31. The peculiar aspects of the rules as employed in the Cleveland and New Or-
leans cases are not discussed, except where relevant to the courts' decisions. For state
litigation concerning other rules, see Atlanta Ass'n of Fire Ins. Agents v. McDonald,
181 Ga. 105, 181 S.E. 822 (1935) (rule forbidding membership to any agent owning
stock in an insurance company not a member of the South-Eastern Underwriters As-
sociation); Louisville Bd. Fire Underwriters v. Johnson, 133 Ky. 797, 119 S.W. 153
(1909) (rule forbidding association members from representing a company having
another agent in their locality) ; Buffalo Ass'n of Fire Underwriters v, Noxseldimick
Co., 235 App. Div. 92, 256 N.Y. Supp. 263 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 260 N.Y. 678, 184 N.E.
142 (1932) (rule setting maximum commissions for members); Cline v. Insurance
Exchange of Houston, 154 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), aff'd, 140 Tex. 175,
166 S.W.2d 677 (1943) (rule excluding from membership any agency owned or con-
trolled by a financial or real estate concern) ; Walter v. Fort Worth Ins. Underwriters'
Ass'n, 79 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (rule forbidding membership to agents
holding an interest in a mutual company).
32. For cases testing this rule under state antitrust statutes, see Atlanta Ass'n
of Fire Ins. Agents v. McDonald, supra note 31 (held illegal) ; Booker & Kinnard v.
Louisville Bd. of Fire Underwriters, 188 Ky. 771, 224 S.W. 451 (1920) (upheld);
Cline v. Insurance Exchange of Houston, supra note 31 (upheld); Walker v. Fort
Worth Ins. Underwriters' Ass'n, supra note 31 (held illegal when combined with
rules forbidding membership to agents of mutual companies and to those owning an
interest in a mutual company).
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include the larger and more desirable agencies,m it is to the company's
advantage to become a "board company," with the result that the competi-
tive position of non-members is weakened. Nor are the adverse effects
of the in-or-out rule confined to non-member agents. If a member agent
wishes to resign his membership, he must give up his affiliation with those
of his companies that decline to become "non-board"; those companies
that agree to retain him stand to lose the affiliation of members who remain
on the board. Loss of even one company may have grave consequences
for an agent; he usually must cancel and rewrite in other companies all
of the policies written by the company with which he has terminated his
relationship, resulting generally in additional premiums for his insureds.34
Thus, because of the in-or-out rule, the member is under pressure to re-
main in the association. Moreover, the rule enables the threat of expulsion
from the organization to have the effect of compelling members to obey
the other rules of the association.
The supposed justification for the rule is that it strengthens the inde-
pendence of the member agent from insurance company domination, which,
in turn, is said to be beneficial to the public.35 But the rule, in creating
an alliance between member agents and the generally stronger companies,
would seem to have monopolistic tendencies and may thus be harmful to
the public. In light of the severely restrictive effect upon competition
arising from the operation of the in-or-out rule, it would seem proper to
hold it illegal per se. Even if the "rule of reason" were applied, however,
the alleged justification for the rule would seem insufficient to deem it
reasonable.
The in-or-out rule was declared illegal as an unreasonable restraint
of trade in the New Orleans case. Considering the rule's aforementioned
effects upon companies and agents, this decision seems to be proper. Pro-
ceedings regarding the in-or-out rule were dismissed in the Cleveland
case on the ground of mootness, the rule having been voluntarily abandoned
by the insurance board. 6
33. The New Orleans Insurance Exchange controls 75% of the fire, casualty, and
surety business in the parishes in which it operates. 148 F. Supp. at 919; see id. at 916
n.2. Members of the Insurance Board of Cleveland write 80% of the fire insurance
business in Cuyahoga County. 144 F. Supp. at 689.
34. Most property insurance policies provide for a pro rata return premium if
the policy is cancelled by the company. Thus, if a one year policy is cancelled at the
end of six months, a return premium of 50% will be allowed. But a new policy will
have to be taken out. If written for one year, the assured must pay a net additional
premium representing the added six months coverage. It is possible to obtain some
forms of insurance for less than an annual period, but at rates proportionally higher
than the annual rate. Thus, if the cancelled policy is re-written for the period that the
original policy had left to run, the premium charged would be higher than the return
premium from the cancelled policy.
35. See Brief for Defendant, p. 72, United States v. Insurance Bd. of Cleveland,
144 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ohio 1956).
36. The growth of multiple-line insurance forced the Cleveland board, formerly
composed solely of agents of fire and marine companies, to drop the rule. Many board
members also represent casualty companies, which were not included within the scope
of the in-or-out rule, and which are represented by non-member as well as by member
agents. The casualty companies now write fire insurance as well as casualty lines, and,
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THE DIRECT WRITER RULE
The direct writer rule declares a person ineligible for membership in
the association if he represents an insurance company that solicits in-
surance directly from policyholders through its own employees. Two
categories of persons are thus excluded from membership in the associa-
tion: employees of direct writing companies and independent agents who
in that capacity represent a company that also operates as a direct writer.
In excluding employees of direct writing companies, the direct writer
rule merely bars from membership in an association of independent in-
surance agents those persons who are not in fact independent agents.
As employees, they operate on a salary basis, selling for the company's
account rather than for their own.37 Even if an employee of a direct writ-
ing company also served as an independent agent for other companies, the
mere fact that the direct writer rule would bar him from association
membership would not seem to invalidate the rule in the absence of some
factor, such as the association's enforcement of the in-or-out rule, which
would place non-members at a competitive disadvantage.3 8
The second aspect of the direct writer rule, and that upon which the
Cleveland case turned, is that it excludes from membership an independent
agent who is an agent for a company that also sells directly to the public.
Thus, a company desiring to deal through independent agents as well
as through its own employees could not be represented by a member of an
association having such a rule. Evidence in the Cleveland case indicated
that there are no stock insurance companies in this country that sell both
directly through their own employees and through independent agents,3 9
nor were the editors able to learn of any; on the other hand, the New
Orleans court found that "some of the stock companies . . . sell directly
to the public in uncontrolled areas." 40 Thus, there is some question
rather than face the disorganization which would have resulted from forcing these
companies to comply with the in-or-out rule, the Cleveland board abandoned it. See
144 F. Supp. at 693-94. Although the problem has not yet been faced by those associ-
ations representing agents selling all lines of property insurance, it is considered to be
only a matter of time until property and life coverage is written in a single policy. See
National Underwriter, Sept. 6, 1956, p. 11; National Undervriter, Aug. 21, 1952, p. 1.
When this occurs, members of associations of property insurance agents who also serve
as life insurance agents will face problems similar to those of the casualty agents who
belonged to the Cleveland board. This could lead to total abandonment of the in-or-out
rule for reasons totally apart from its probable illegality.
37. See Bultman, Can You Explain This to the Public?, Rough Notes, Sept. 1956,
p. 50.
38. See text at note 41 infra.
39. 144 F. Supp. at 699, 702. Although there are some mutual companies writing
both directly and through independent agents, their agents would be excluded by virtue
of the mutual rule, discussed at note 57 infra, which appears to be legal.
40. 148 F. Supp. at 918. However, the direct writer rule in that case included in
its definition of a "direct writer" a company "whose State Agent Special Agent, Man-
ager or salaried representative solicits from or issues policies or bonds direct to the
public... ." Id. at 917 n.8. The direct writer rule in its pure form would not be so
broad in scope. Some of these designated employees do represent their companies as
agents and sell to the public in this capacity in some localities. The New Orleans court
did not further elaborate its statement, and it is possible that it referred to this situ-
ation.
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whether the direct writer rule excludes anyone at present who falls into
the category of "independent agent for a direct writer."
Assuming, however, that there are companies which write both
directly and through independent agents, or are desirous of doing so,
the effect of the rule upon them or upon non-member agents and the
insuring public would appear to be insubstantial. Unless non-membership
in the association means a weakening of the agent's competitive position,
such as would be the case if the association enforced the in-or-out rule,
the non-member agent representing a direct writer would suffer no harm
from the direct writer rule other than the loss of eligibility for association
membership. Thus, if the in-or-out rule were enforced the direct writer
agent would be denied access to "board companies," but without the in-
or-out rule he would be able to represent any company desiring his
services. Nor would the direct writer rule harm a member agent who
wishes to represent a direct writer; such an agent would presumably
be free to leave the association without penalty, unless, again, the in-or-
out rule were enforced, for he could continue to represent all companies.
Moreover, a direct writing company desiring to sell through an independent
agent would be able to engage non-member agents, or might be able to
induce members to resign from the association to represent it. And a
company represented by member agents wishing to make direct solicita-
tions would be free to hire agents who are not members of the association,
or to induce the association members to leave the organization, which, in
view of the hardship to an agent if he loses a company, would probably
not be difficult.4
The only risk to a company represented by member agents that
wishes to enter the direct writing field would be the possible loss of an
agent who values his association membership more highly than his connec-
tion with the company. Since such a company would be free to obtain other
agents in the area and could also sell directly through its own employees,
and since the opening of its own sales offices would probably offset any
loss in market oulets caused by the withdrawal of member agents, this
risk seems to be minimal. Yet, the Cleveland court invalidated the direct
writer rule on that potentiality, despite the fact that no showing was made
that any company represented by board members desired to enter the
direct writer field, or had actually done so in other localities, or that one
was deterred from making direct solicitations for this reason, and despite
the absence of pressure upon a member of the board to remain in the
association. Though holding the direct writer rule illegal, the Cleveland
court admitted that it "may well be true" that the direct writer rule
"occasions no hardship to the public." 4 Direct writers are free to
41. See text at note 34 supra.
42. See 144 F. Supp. at 705. The Cleveland court recognized that there was no
economic sanction connected with leaving the association in denying summary judg-
ment on the mutual rule. Id. at 705-06.
43. Id. at 700.
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operate outside of the association, and members of the public can pur-
chase insurance from them, the direct writer rule notwithstanding. It
would thus appear that the effect of the direct writer rule upon commerce,
absent the concurrent operation of the in-or-out rule, would not be so
substantial as to warrant its invalidation as illegal per se.
Applying the "rule of reason," it is necessary to determine whether
there is sufficient justification for the direct writer rule to offset any effect
it might have upon competition. 44 The rule is designed to protect the
association and its members from insurance company domination and to
permit the association to carry on advertising campaigns aimed at equal-
izing the competitive position of the independent agent with that of the
employee of the direct writer, whose policies generally sell for less.4
Fear of agency domination by direct writing companies stems chiefly
from the fact that a company having agents who are board members
would have access to the agents' policy expiration data, by use of which
it could solicit its agents' customers through its own employees directly,
thus saving on the agents' commission.4 6 Although the weight of authority
is to the effect that the independent insurance agent representing stock
companies owns the expiration rights of the policies written by him,
4
7
there is some authority to the contrary, 48 while other cases hold that the
company has an ownership right in expiration data concomitant with
that of the agent.49 Even where the agent is held to have an exclusive
right in his expiration data this right would be difficult to protect. Em-
ployees of a direct writer would not be precluded from soliciting the
customers of their company's member agent-Io and it would be difficult
if not impossible to prove that the agent's expiration records were in
fact used in such solicitation. Furthermore, the agent may have placed
only part of the insurance covering the risk solicited with the direct
writing company; nonetheless, the company's employee may succeed in
obtaining all of the insurance upon it. Not only the agent of a direct
writer but also his customer may be placed at a disadvantage. The cus-
44. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) ; Board of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
45. Cf. Brief for Defendant, p. 8, United States v. Insurance Bd. of Cleveland,
144 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ohio 1956).
46. See United States v. Insurance Bd. of Cleveland, 144 F. Supp. 684, 700 (N.D.
Ohio 1956).
47. See In re Chapman, 50 F.2d 252 (W.D. Ky. 1931); F. B. Miller Agency, Inc.
v. Home Ins. Co., 276 Ill. App. 418 (1934). Both the Cleveland and New Orleans
cases recognized this right by way of dictum. See 144 F. Supp. at 704; 148 F. Supp. at
916 nl. It has been held that an insurance company owns the expiration rights in those
policies for which it has not been paid by the agent. Alliance Ins. Co. v. City Realty
Co., 52 F.2d 271 (M.D. Ga. 1931).
48. See Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Downing & Downing, 88 Pa. Super. 133 (1926).
49. Port Inv. Co. v. Oregon Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 163 Ore. 1, 16-17, 94 P.2d 734,
740 (1939) (dictum) ; see Annot., 124 A.L.R. 1355 (1940). Contra, National Fire Ins.
Co. v. Sullard, 97 App. Div. 233, 89 N.Y. Supp. 934 (2d Dep't 1904).
50. See Northwest Underwriters, Inc. v. Hamilton, 151 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1945).
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tomer may deal through an independent insurance agent because there is
an incentive for the agent to represent his interests against the company
should a conflict develop.5 1 But because the direct writing company
potentially threatens its independent agent with a loss of business, the
agent's incentive to protect the interests of his insured may be weakened.
The other reason for the direct writer rule stems from the fact that
policies written directly are often written at lower premiums than those
of stock companies represented exclusively by independent agents.
2
Direct writers have increased both their actual volume of coverage and
their proportional share of the insurance market in recent years.&5 3 In an
effort to meet this lower-priced competition, insurance associations have
resorted to advertising and publicity campaigns.54 Naturally, if such
associations were to admit agents of direct writers, the latter would be
reluctant to participate in such a program and might bring about its
termination.
Because the effect of the direct writer rule upon commerce is slight
and because of the justification for the rule, it would appear that the
rule should be held to be reasonable. Where the rule is coupled with
the in-or-out rule, as in the New Orleans case, the proper result would
appear to be to strike down the in-or-out rule, not to invalidate both rules
as the court there did.
The discussion of the direct writer rule has until this point focused
upon the denial of membership to employees or agents of direct writing
companies. There is an additional phase of the rule as employed by both
the Cleveland and New Orleans associations which precludes from mem-
bership agents representing a stock company operating entirely under
the American agency system whose employees are licensed as agents or
solicitors for their own account. The alleged justification for this phase
of the rule is that it prevents such employee-agents from utilizing the
expiration data of the member agents to solicit for their own accounts.55
The admitted object of this requirement is thus to compel companies to
prohibit their employees from serving as agents in their own right. Un-
like the direct writer rule in its pure form, the rule with this added feature
is designed to eliminate the competition of employee-agents. As such, it
should properly be held to be illegal per se.5 6
51. See text at note 1 supra.
52. See Bultman, supra note 37, at 50; Eastern Underwriter, Nov. 26, 1954, p. 1;
National Underwriter, Dec. 17, 1953, p. 25.
53. See Eastern Underwriter, Dec. 1, 1954, p. 28; Eastern Underwriter, April 9,
1954, p. 25; National Underwriter, Nov. 1, 1951, p. 24; cf. Eastern Underwriter, July
16, 1954, p. 22.
54. National Underwriter, Oct. 25, 1956, p. 44.
55. Supplemental Memorandum for Defendant, pp. 17-19, United States v. Insur-
ance Bd. of Cleveland, 144 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ohio 1956).
56. Oddly enough, the Cleveland court ignored this phase of the direct writer rule
before it, choosing instead to invalidate the rule on the less substantial grounds dis-
cussed above.
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THE MUTUAL RULE 57
The mutual rule excludes from membership in the association agents
who represent mutual insurance companies exclusively and also those who
represent both stock and mutual companies. In excluding those who
represent mutual companies exclusively, the operation of the mutual rule
is indistinguishable from that of the direct writer rule in that it bars from
the association those who are not independent agents of stock insurers.
58
But in excluding agents representing both stock and mutual companies,
operation of the mutual rule differs from that of the direct writer rule in
that there are agents who represent both types of companies. 5 9
The justification for the mutual rule is in part the same as for the
direct writer rule: (1) to protect the association and its members from
insurance company domination and (2) to enable the association's mem-
bers to compete with direct writers through advertising. The danger of
mutual company domination of its agents is even greater than that of
a direct-writing stock company, for the courts have held that the com-
pany, not the agent, owns the expiration rights in a mutual policy.60 Thus,
a mutual company can renew its policies directly or through another of
its agents if it so desires, and can use threats to do so as a means of control
over its agents. Furthermore, since mutual insurance generally is lower
priced than coverage through a stock company, and since both the actual
amount of property insurance and the proportional share of the fire and
casualty market insured by mutual companies is increasing,6 ' stock agents'
associations advertise to meet this competition; there is danger that mem-
bers representing mutual insurers might soon undermine such advertising
programs.62
Still another reason underlies the mutual rule. Associations of inde-
pendent insurance agents are usually dedicated to the stock insurance
principle; this may be recognized in the association's charter.P There are
certain basic differences between stock and mutual insurance companies
arising from the fact that stock companies are owned by stockholders
57. For state cases on the mutual rule see Atlanta Ass'n of Fire Ins. Agents v.
McDonald, 181 Ga. 105, 181 S.E. 822 (1935) (injunction granted against enforcement
of in-or-out rule and mutual rule together; dictum apparently upholding mutual rule
standing alone); Walker v. Fort Worth Ins. Underwriters' Ass'n, 79 S.W.2d 661
(Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (rule upheld).
58. Associations of independent insurance agents are usually devoted to the stock
insurance principle. See text at note 63 infra.
59. See text at note 39 supra.
60. See Hedlund v. Farmers Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 139 F. Supp. 535 (D. Minn.
1956) ; United States v. Insurance Bd. of Cleveland, 144 F. Supp. 684, 703-04 (N.D.
Ohio 1956) (dictum); cf. Kerr & Elliott v. Green Mountain Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
111 Vt. 502, 18 A.2d 164 (1941) (expiration rights reserved contractually by agent).
61. See United States v. Insurance Bd. of Cleveland, supra note 60, at 703; Smith,
The Future Outlook for Mutual Insurance, 172 WzKxIy UNmiRWRITaF 947 (1955).
62. See text at note 52 supra.
63. See United States v. Insurance Bd. of Cleveland, 144 F. Supp. 684, 705 (N.D.
Ohio 1956).
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while mutuals are owned by their policyholders. A major distinction is
that a mutual policy may be subject to assessments in case of insolvency; 64
the freedom from assessability enjoyed by policyholders in a stock com-
pany may be emphasized by the association in its advertising campaigns.
As the Cleveland court stated, agents who represent mutual companies
cannot "be expected to accept completely the Board's philosophy of doing
business." 6
In operation, the mutual rule does not interfere with the ability of
mutual companies to hire non-member agents of the association, and, in
the absence of any rule (such as the in-or-out rule) penalizing a member
of the association for leaving its ranks, does not prevent mutual companies
from inducing association members to leave the association and represent
them. Indeed, it would seem that mutual companies would prefer that
their agents did not belong to an association opposed to their principle
of organization. 6 Also, except in the hypothetical situation of a stock
company becoming mutual in form, the mutual rule cannot affect companies
represented by association members; it is impossible for a company to be
both stock and mutual simultaneously, in contrast to the possibility that
a company might sell both directly and through independent agents.
Neither does the mutual rule harm the public, which is free to insure
with a mutual company despite the rule's existence.
Recognizing these factors, the court in United States v. Insurance
Board of Cleveland declined to grant summary judgment declaring the
mutual rule to be illegal. This result seems proper in light of the facts be-
fore the court in that case. A trial in which evidence of the effect of the
rule upon commerce is introduced should produce the same result. The
effect of the mutual rule upon commerce does not seem to be so substantial
as to warrant a holding that the rule is illegal per se, and its justification
would seem to support a holding that the rule is reasonable. Oddly enough,
the reasoning of the court in refusing to hold the mutual rule illegal seems to
apply also to the direct writer rule in its pure form, which the same
court struck down as illegal.
Faced with a combination of the mutual rule and the in-or-out rule,
the New Orleans court ruled both to be illegal. The result seems to have
been influenced primarily by the effect of the in-or-out rule, 7 and in light
of this latter rule was justified. However, the court should have clarified
its position in regard to the mutual rule standing apart from the in-or-out
rule; as so viewed, it would have been proper to find the mutual rule
unobjectionable.
64. This contingent liability may be present even if the policy is designated "non-
assessable." See, e.g., LA. Rsv. STAT. AN. §22:132 (1951); Onio RE:v. CODE ANN.
§§ 3941.10, 3941.15 (Page 1954) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 918 (Purdon 1954).
65. 144 F. Supp. at 705.
66. See id. at 707. In the Cleveland case former officers of a mutual agents' asso-
ciation submitted affidavits to the effect that the mutual rule did not result in injury to
their business. Id. at 705, 707.
67. 148 F. Supp. at 920-21.
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THE NON-DEVIATION RULE
The non-deviation rule denies membership in the association to agents
of insurance companies that deviate from rates established by a rating
bureau. A rating bureau is an authority empowered by the insurance
laws of a state to determine insurance rates for its members. 68 Generally,
most stock insurance companies which sell through agents belong to a
single rating bureau in a given state and abide by the rate schedule filed
by it. Occasionally, a stock insurance company submits its own rating
schedule to the insurance departments; such rates are invariably lower than
those filed by the rating bureau, to which the company filing them may
or may not belong.69
The companies primarily affected by this rule are stock companies
selling solely through independent agents.70 Unlike direct writers and
mutual insurers, these companies are indistinguishable from stock in-
surers who adhere to rating bureau schedules, except for the premiums
that they charge. They operate under the American agency system and
are fully in accord with its principles; their agents are as independent as
those of any other non-direct writing stock company. Thus, admission
of agents of deviating companies to membership would not be counter to
either the purposes or the principles of the independent insurance agents'
association.
Since the larger and better established stock insurance agencies are
likely to have association membership,7' the non-deviation rule denies
deviating companies the representation of these agents. The result is
that companies otherwise willing to deviate, being dependent entirely
upon independent stock insurance agents to sell their product, are forced
to accept the rates set by the rating bureau. It is in this respect that the
effect of the non-deviation rule differs from that of the direct writer and
mutual rules; neither mutual companies nor direct writer companies
depend upon independent agents to sell their insurance for them; both
generally have their own selling organizations. While mutual and direct
writing insurance companies can get along without independent stock
insurance agents, the deviating stock company cannot.
68. See, e.g., LA. Rlv. STATr. ANN. §§ 22:1407, 22:1409 (1951); N.Y. INs. LAW
§ 181; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3935.04 (Page 1954) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1186
(Purdon 1954).
69. See United States v. Insurance Bd. of Cleveland, 144 F. Supp. 684, 695-96
(N.D. Ohio 1956). The insurance rating laws of most states permit insurance com-
panies to either file rates individually or adopt those of the rating organization to
which they belong. In either case, rates are subject to the approval of the insurance
commissioner. See, e.g., N.Y. INs. LAw §§ 183-86; OHIO GsN. CoDs ANN. §§ 3935.04,
3935.07, 3937.03-.06 (Page 1954) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1183-87 (Purdon 1954).
In Louisiana, state rating bureaus set rates for fire and casualty risks, but companies
may belong to private rating bureaus, and deviations from the rates of the state bureaus
are permitted. See LA. Riv. STAT. ANN. §§ 22:1401, 22:1405, 22:1407-10 (1951),
22:1406 (Supp. 1956).
70. Although many mutual and direct writing stock companies deviate from rating
bureau rates, they would be precluded from representation by association members
through the operation of the direct writer and mutual rules, even in the absence of the
non-deviation rule.
71. See note 33 supra.
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The Insurance Board of Cleveland admitted that this rule was de-
signed to standardize insurance rates. It justified the rule on the ground
that deviating companies' rates are not actuarially as sound as those set by
rating bureaus, and therefore, these companies are more likely to become
financially impaired7 2 However, the rule may also have been influenced
by the fact that smaller premiums mean smaller commissions to the agent.
This being the case, a deviating company would find it difficult to induce
a board member to relinquish his membership in order to represent it,
even in the absence of the in-or-out rule.
Not only does the rule foreclose deviating companies from a segment
of the market by denying them the facilities of association members, but it
also forces the public to pay higher premiums to those companies who,
were it not for their fear of losing member agents, might charge lower
premiums. Furthermore, the rule is counter to the spirit of the insurance
laws of most states, which provide that "nothing . . . shall be construed
as requiring any insurer to become a member of or subscriber to any rating
organization . . . [U]niformity among insurers . . . is neither re-
quired nor prohibited." 73
Bearing in mind the purpose and results of the operation of the non-
deviation rule, it is apparent that it should be held to be illegal per se. But
even if it be argued that the "rule of reason" should be applied, it would
seem that the justification for the rule is doubtful. The rating laws of most
states provide that adequacy of rates is a factor to be considered by the
insurance commissioner in approving or disapproving rate filings."4 Con-
siderations of this sort are best left to the appropriate state agency, rather
than to the members of a private association.
Both the Cleveland and New Orleans associations at one time fol-
lowed the non-deviation rule, but both have abandoned it. The rule was
not litigated in the New Orleans case, and the court refused to enjoin its
enforcement in the Cleveland case on the ground that "there is no reasonable
expectation that this rule will be revived." 7-
THE RECIPROCITY RULE 76
The reciprocity rule prohibits members of the association from trans-
acting business with non-member agents.77 The primary impact of the
72. 144 F. Supp. at 695-96.
73. N.Y. INs. LAW § 184; accord, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1404 (Supp.
1956) ; OHio REv. CoDE ANN. § 3935.01 (Page 1954) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1181
(Purdon 1954).
74. See, e.g., LA. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 22:1404 (1951); N.Y. INS. LAW § 183;
Oxio REv. CODE ANN. §§3935.03, 3937.02 (Page 1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§ 1183 (Purdon 1954).
75. 144 F. Supp. at 696; see 148 F. Supp. at 921.
76. For state litigation concerning this rule, see Atlanta Ass'n of Fire Ins. Agents
v. McDonald, 181 Ga. 105, 181 S.E. 822 (1935) (held illegal) ; Bersch v. Fire Under-
writers Ass'n of St. Louis, 241 S.W. 428 (Mo. 1922) (upheld); Cline v. Insurance
Exchange of Houston, 154 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), aff'd, 140 Tex. 175,
166 S.W.2d 677 (1943) (upheld).
77. The rule as promulgated by the Insurance Board of Cleveland exempted "sur-
plus business." "Surplus business" was defined as insurance in excess of the amount a
member could obtain through the facilities of his own companies or those of other
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rule is upon brokerage business. It is generally the practice of insurance
companies to limit the amount of insurance that they will write on a single
location. Occasionally, therefore, an agent finds himself with an order for
more insurance on a particular risk than his companies will handle, in
which case, he will "broker out" the excess, giving it to some other agent
to place and sharing the commission with him. 78 The effects of the reci-
procity rule are to deny the brokerage facilities of the association to non-
members and to deny non-members the brokerage business of members.
The rule is said to aid and promote "the ethical and professional standards
espoused by the . . . Board." 79
The fact that a non-member agent needing brokerage facilities is cut
off from those companies represented exclusively by member agents 8 may
cause extreme hardship if no company represented by non-member agents
wishes to insure the property for a larger amount than is already carried
on it; the non-member may be forced to give up business to a member
agent as a result. Even if members are permitted to write for non-
members coverage not obtainable elsewhere,8 ' as under the former rules of
the Cleveland association, the rule may still prevent non-members from
placing the business in the companies that either they or their customers
desire, if brokerage facilities are available outside the board. Not only does
this aspect of the rule put non-members at a competitive disadvantage, but
it also makes the brokerage business of non-members unavailable to com-
panies represented solely by member agents. Accordingly, the rule as
written should at least be condemned as an unreasonable restraint upon
trade, and its effect probably warrants a holding that it is illegal per se.
But the rule could be rewritten so as to require only that member
agents first make available their brokerage business to other member
agents. In such an event, the rule would amount to a requirements or ex-
clusive dealing contract. Although certain requirements contracts are
declared to be illegal under section three of the Clayton Act,8 this provi-
sion applies only to contracts pertaining to tangible goods ;8 a brokerage
members, and that which a non-member is unable to place through the facilities of
companies represented by himself or other non-member agents. Approval of the secre-
tary of the board was necessary for the brokerage of "surplus business." The subse-
quent analysis of the reciprocity rule applies equally to a rule containing this added
provision.
78. In order to carry on this practice the agent must be licensed separately as a
broker in many states. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 22:1166 (Supp. 1956); N.Y. INs.
LAW § 119; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 252 (Purdon 1954).
79. Brief for Defendant, p. 64, United States v. Insurance Bd. of Cleveland, 144
F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ohio 1956).
80. Agreements to foreclose competitors from a part of the market have been held
to be illegal per se. International Salt. Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) ;
see United States v. Women's Sportswear Manufacturers Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949).
81. See note 77 supra.
82. Clayton Act § 3, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1952).
83. Ibid.; see FTC v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923); United States v.
Investors Diversified Serv., Inc., 102 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn. 1951); United States v.
General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp 753, 884 (D.N.J. 1951), modified on other grounds, 115
F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953).
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agreement is a contract for services, and would not fall within this section.
Requirements contracts may also be held to violate section one of the
Sherman Act. 4 However, under neither act are all requirements con-
tracts illegal,5 unless competition is restrained.8 6  Cases in which require-
ments contracts have been held to be illegal under either the Sherman or the
Clayton Act have been generally characterized by some inequality be-
tween the contracting parties. Thus, contracts which the consumer is
forced to sign through coercion,8 7 contracts in which an exclusive dealing
arrangement is linked to a franchise, 8 and requirements contracts tied to a
sale or lease of a patented product 8 9 have been condemned.
An agreement among insurance agents to give each other their
brokerage business would not fall within these categories. It is true that
such an agreement precludes non-member agents and their companies
from the market for members' brokerage business. But the effect of this
agreement on competitors is no different than that of any other contract
for the sale of goods or services. "[T]o a limited degree, any sale
. . . necessarily involves the exclusion of a competitor." 9 Further-
more, the effect upon non-members and their companies is only incidental.
With the exception of a few large national brokerage specialists, brokerage
business forms a relatively small share of the insurance placed by an agent.
Furthermore, the customer is usually not affected by brokerage agree-
ments; he has given his business to the primary agent to place where he
may; chances are, if his business is brokered, the customer is ignorant of
the fact.91 Thus, it would appear that while the reciprocity rule should be
declared illegal insofar as it precludes the use of the association brokerage
84. United States v. Women's Sportswear Manufacturers Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460
(1949) ; United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd,
343 U.S. 922 (1952) ; United States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal.
1949); cf. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1944). The degree of re-
straint needed for a violation of the Sherman Act to occur is greater than that which
will violate the Clayton Act. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345
U.S. 594, 610 (1953); Dictograph Products, Inc. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir.
1954) ; United States v. American Linen Supply Co., 141 F. Supp. 105, 112 (N.D. Ill.
1956).
85. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948) ; see United States
v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18, 31 (N.D. Cal. 1949) (dictum) ; United States v.
Linde Air Products Co., 83 F. Supp. 978, 981 (N.D. Ill. 1949) (dictum).
86. See, e.g., Clayton Act § 3, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1952);
United States v. Women's Sportswear Manufacturers Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949);
United States v. Richfield Oil Co., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), affd, 343 U.S.
922 (1952) ; United States v. Linde Air Products Co., supra note 85.
87. United States v. Women's Sportswear Manufacturers Ass'n, supra note 86.
88. E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) ; United States
v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 922 (1952).
89. E.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); United
States v. American Linen Supply Co., 141 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Ill. 1956); United
States v. Linde Air Products Co., 83 F. Supp. 978 (N.D. Ill. 1949).
90. Id. at 982; see Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1944).
91. On rare occasions, a customer may be particular as to the companies in which
his business is placed. This is the situation mentioned in text at note 81 supra. In
such a case, the exclusive brokerage arrangement may actually hurt the member, who
may lose his business to an outside agent if'the desired company is not represented by
a board member.
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facilities by a non-member, there seems to be no objection to a rule under
which each member agrees to place his brokerage within the association.
The reciprocity rule has been abandoned by the Cleveland board, and
litigation concerning this rule was dismissed in the Cleveland case on the
ground of mootness. No rule of this nature was litigated in the .New
Orleans case.
TiE SERVICE OFFICE RULE 92
As originally drafted by the Insurance Board of Cleveland, the service
office rule declared agents ineligible for membership if they represented
insurance companies operating service branch offices catering to Cleveland
agents. These offices perform policy writing, recording and other services
for their agents; they enable an agent to operate with less overhead by
assuming much of his clerical burden and thus make it easier for a new
agent to get his start. The agent using a service branch office usually re-
ceives a lower commission from the company.
The reason for the service office rule is said to be that the use of serv-
ice offices increases the cost of insurance to the public and makes the agent
dependent upon his companies, since he must rely upon them for many of
his vital functions.93
With the abolition of these offices, the new agent finds it much
more expensive to enter the insurance field, with the result that the rule
lessens competition for member agents. The rule also precludes a company
represented by association members from establishing service offices which
might prove profitable in permitting lower commissions or in making it
easier for the company to obtain new representatives. By restricting entry
into the insurance field, the service office rule might lead to public harm
in the form of monopoly. The rule should therefore be held to be illegal
per se, or at the least, an unreasonable restraint of trade under the "rule
of reason." 94
The amended service office rule as litigated in the Cleveland case is
much less sweeping in form. The rule prevents members who have been
agents for more than five years and who devote full time to the insurance
business from utilizing the services of a branch office, but they may continue
to represent companies operating branch office facilities. Summary judg-
ment declaring this form of the service office rule to be legal was denied
by the Cleveland court on the ground that there were no branch service
offices at present in Cuyahoga County, nor was there any "evidence tending
92. Terminology is that of the author. The rule was referred to in the Cleveland
case as "the rule prohibiting agents from accepting policy-writing or recording services
from insurance companies." 144 F. Supp at 702.
93. Brief for Defendant, pp. 54-55, United States v. Insurance Bd. of Cleveland,
144 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ohio 1956).
94. The Insurance Board of Cleveland obtained agreements from the companies
represented by its agents to abolish their service branch offices in the Cleveland area.
These agreements were enacted in 1937, when the Cleveland Board had the in-or-out
rule. Thus, any company refusing to comply with the Board's wishes stood to lose all
of its Cuyahoga County agents. 144 F. Supp. at 702-03.
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to show whether it is likely that companies will again establish branch
offices for such purposes." 95
It would appear that the Cleveland court erred in refusing to hold this
rule illegal. By preventing established association members from using
service offices, this rule would seem to make the institution of such offices
by the companies unprofitable.96 Indeed, the findings of the Cleveland court
indicate that the rule has this result.97 In discouraging the establishment
of such offices, the amended rule continues to impede the establishment of
any new agents in the Cleveland area. Even in its modified form, the serv-
ice office rule appears to be illegal at least under the "rule of reason,"
and probably illegal per se.98
CONCLUSION
Rules of insurance agents' associations might be construed to be boy-
cotts. Much authority considers boycotts to be illegal per se. However,
only some of the rules of insurance agents' associations discussed herein
appear in fact to be designed to restrict competition, or to have the effect
of doing so to such a degree that justification becomes immaterial. Rules
of this category, such as the in-or-out rule, the non-deviation rule, the
service office rule and the reciprocity rule as applied to non-members'
business, would seem to be illegal per se. On the other hand, the mutual
rule and the direct writer rule do not appear to have the same effect, and
they may therefore be examined under the "rule of reason." Since they
establish reasonable qualifications for membership, and since their effect
upon other than association members is slight, it would seem proper to hold
them to be legal. The reciprocity rule as applied to members' brokerage
business primarily affects the conduct of member agents; it does not ap-
pear to exert a substantial effect upon the competitive position of outsiders,
and likewise should not be held to be illegal, either through application of
a per se rule or under the "rule of reason." It would seem that the legality
of other rules of insurance agents' associations can also be tested in this
manner, with the inquiry focusing upon the rule's effect on competition,
rather than upon whether the rule can be described as a "boycott" and
rendered illegal per se solely on this ground.
B.I.B.
95. Ibid.
96. Many of the companies operating in the Cleveland area do have service branch
offices in other areas.
97. 144 F. Supp. at 702-03.
98. The service office rule was not litigated in the New Orleans case.
